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-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FRsT AMENDMENT-THE PUBLIC AND PRESS
HAVE A RIGHT OF

ACCESS

TO CRIMINAL TRIALS ABSENT AN

OVERRIDING INTEREST ARTICULATED IN FINDINGS.

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia (U.S. 1980)
John Paul Stevenson was convicted of second-degree murder in connection with the 1975 stabbing death of a Virginia hotel manager.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed this conviction on the ground
-that certain evidence had been improperly admitted. 2 During a subselquent retrial, 3 defense counsel moved that the trial be closed to the
.public and press in order to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial
by preventing information concerning testimony from reaching prospective witnesses. 4 The prosecutor made no objection 5 and the judge
,ordered the courtroom cleared.0 Among those expelled were Wheeler
and McCarthy, two reporters for Richmond Newspapers, Inc.7 A motion
,to vacate the closure order was filed by Richmond Newspapers, Inc. and
1. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2818-19
. 1980).
2. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1977).
The prosecution introduced expert testimony that blood on a shirt purportedly
belonging to the defendant was of the same type as that of the deceased and
alleged that Stevenson had worn the shirt at the time he committed the murder.
Id. at 464, 237 S.E.2d at 781. Police had obtained possession of the shirt from
the defendant's wife after asking her what her husband had been wearing when
he returned home on the morning following the murder. Id. at 465-66, 237
S.E.2d at 781. Mrs. Stevenson did not testify at the trial but the police officer
who had obtained the shirt from her testified as to her act of leading him to
the shirt. Id. at 465, 237 S.E.2d at 781. The Court held that the officer's testimony relating to the shirt was inadmissible hearsay and concluded, therefore,
that the introduction into evidence of both the shirt and the results of the
scientific tests conducted thereon were without proper foundation. Id. at 466,
237 S.E.2d at 782.
3. 100 S. Ct. at 2818.
xesulted in mistrials. Id.

Two previous attempts to retry Stevenson had

4. Id. at 2819.
5. Id.
6. Id. Witnesses were admitted to the courtroom only while on the stand
testifying. Id. When issuing his closure order, the trial judge apparently relied
on VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1975), which provides in pertinent part: "In the trial
of all criminal cases . . . the court may, in its discretion, exclude from the
trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated." Id.
.See 100 S. Ct. at 2819.
7. 100 S. Ct. at 2818-19.

(183)
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its two reporters.8 Following a hearing on the motion, 9 the trial judge
1
denied the request 10 and the closed trial resumed the next day."
Richmond Newspapers and the two reporters appealed the validity of
the closure order to the Virginia Supreme Court 12 which upheld the
closure. The United States Supreme Court granted appellants' petition
for certiorari 13 and reversed, holding that the first and fourteenth
amendments guarantee that, absent an overriding interest articulated in
findings, the public and press have a right of access to criminal trials.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
Throughout its development, both in England and in the United
States, the criminal trial has consistently been open to all who have
chosen to attend.' 4 Originally, freemen were compelled to attend the
Anglo-Saxon forerunner of the modern trial. 15 When this requirement
lapsed, English trials remained open to all who chose to attend.' 6 This
characteristic of openness was adopted by the American colonists,' 7 and
continued as normal practice throughout American history.' 8 The
8. Id. at 2819. Counsel for the newspapers argued that, prior to closing
the trial to the public, constitutional considerations required the judge to find
that no other less drastic measures would protect the defendant's right to a
fair trial. Id.
9. Id. Defense counsel expressed concern that inaccurate accounts of the
trial would be published and then read by the jurors. Id. This concern differs
from that expressed by defense counsel when the motion was originally made.
See id.; note 4 and accompanying text supra.
10. 100 S. Ct. at 2819. The judge noted his concern about spectators in
the courtroom constituting a distraction to the jurors.

Id. The prosecution

again offered no objection to the closure order. Id. Out of deference to the
rights of the defendant, and in the absence of any perceived countervailing
considerations, the judge denied the motion to vacate the closure order. Id.
11. Id. at 2820. Following presentation of the Commonwealth's evidence,
the judge found the defendant not guilty. Id.
12. Id. Following conclusion of the trial, the trial court granted appellants' motion to intervene in the Stevenson case. Id.
13. 444 U.S. 897 (1979). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976), certiorari
was granted specifically "to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed
to the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a
fair trial, or that some other overriding consideration requires closure." 100
S. Ct. at 2821. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976), the reporters and the
newspapers had also filed a notice of appeal from the decision of the Virginia
Supreme Court. 100 S. Ct. at 2820. The Court postponed consideration of
the question of its jurisdiction over the appeal until the hearing of the case
on its merits. See 444 U.S. 896 (1979). Such jurisdiction was subsequently
found lacking, however, because the appellants had never explicitly challenged
the constitutionality of VA. CODE § 19.2-266 (1975) in the Virginia courts. 100
S. Ct. at 2820 n.4.
14. See notes 15-18 9: 70-71 and accompanying text infra.
15. See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 419 (1979) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16. See id. at 423 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17. See id. at 424-25 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
18. See id. at 414 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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,openness of trials was implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in
Bridges v. California19 and Pennekamp v. Florida,20 and was explicitly
recognized in Craig v. Harney 21 where the Court stated: "A trial is a
public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public property." 22
19. 314 U.S. 252 (1941). In Bridges, publishers of editorials calling for jail
sentences, rather than probation, for convicted but as yet unsentenced union
enforcers were held in contempt of court. Id. at 271-72. The Supreme Court
observed that "the very word 'trial' connotes decisions on the evidence and
arguments properly advanced in open court." Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
20. 328 U.S. 331 (1946). In Pennekamp, publishers of editorials and cartoons which, in the eyes of the county court judges, tended to hold the judges
up for unfair ridicule and attacked their integrity, and commented on pending
litigation, were held in contempt of court. Id. at 336-40. Justice Frankfurter,
concurring, observed that "trials must be public and the public have a deep
interest in trials." Id. at 361 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Openness of criminal trials was an underlying assumption in subsequent
cases dealing with the circumstances in which a trial may be closed. See
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Before and during Sheppard's
sensationalized murder trial, the jury was exposed to biased, inaccurate, and
pervasive press coverage. Id. at 339-49. This was held to be a violation of the
defendant's due process rights. Id. at 335. While reaching this conclusion, the
right of the public and press to attend trials seemed to be an implicit premise
for the Court's analysis. Id. at 350. The Court noted that the public examination of the criminal justice system facilitated by press coverage prevents the
miscarriage of justice. Id. at 349-50. Noting an increase in unfair and prejudicial comment on pending litigation by the press, the Court nonetheless stated
that "[t]here is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that
transpire in the courtroom." Id. at 362-63. When discussing the steps a trial
judge may take to protect a defendant's due process rights, the Court's language
indicates that a trial judge may limit and control the presence of the press,
but not that he may eliminate that presence altogether. See id. at 358. Accord,
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 596 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment). For a discussion of Nebraska Press, see notes 29-33 and
accompanying text infra.
See also In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). In Oliver, a Michigan circuit
judge, sitting as a one-man grand jury, found the testimony of a witness to be
unsatisfactory and immediately convicted and sentenced him to jail for contempt. Id. at 259. This procedure was held to violate the defendant's due
process rights. Id. at 273. The Supreme Court stated:
In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their
inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our
federal and state governments that criminal trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his
liberty without due process of law means at least that an accused
cannot be thus sentenced to prison.
Id.
The Court indicated that such secrecy was virtually unprecedented in
Anglo-American history. Id. at 273.
The defendant's due process right to a public trial should be distinguished
from his sixth amendment right to a public trial. See note 61 and accompanying text infra. Unlike the sixth amendment, which applies only to criminal
prosecutions, the due process protection applies to all adjudications of guilt,
such as contempt proceedings. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960).
21. 331 U.S. 367 (1947). In Craig, a county court judge held that the publishers of editorials urging him to grant a civil defendant's motion for a new
trial were in contempt of court. Id. at 369-70. The Supreme Court held the
findings of contempt to be in violation of the first amendment. Id. at 374.
22. Id. See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). The Estes Court
held that a defendant's right to a fair trial was violated by the presence in the
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Drawing upon the first amendment's guarantee of the freedom of
the press to report on public events, 28 the Supreme Court has protected

the right of the press to report on judicial proceedings.2 4 This first
amendment protection was relied upon in Bridges25 and Pennekamp2 o
where the Court afforded first amendment protection to published comments concerning pending litigation. 27 The Court noted that comments
courtroom, over the defendant's objections, of television cameras. Id. at 534-35.
Dealing with the argument that the public's right to know justified the presence
of television cameras the Court observed that "the public has the right to be
informed as to what occurs in its courts, but reporters of all media, including
television, are always present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report
whatever occurs in open court through their respective media." Id. at 541-42.
A concurring opinion noted that, despite the great usefulness of the medium
of television, "television representatives have only the rights of the general
public, namely, to be present, to observe the proceedings, and thereafter, if
they choose, to report them." Id. at 586 (Warren, C.J., concurring). But see
id. at 588-89 (Harlan, J., concurring) (maintaining that television cameras are
not entitled to presence in the courtroom since everyone's right to be there is
severely limited; the right of "public trial" belongs to the accused and confers
no rights on the public). For a discussion of the current status of the "cameras
in the courtroom" controversy, see notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
Prior to 1979, only in dicta had the Court indicated that the public and
press could be barred from a trial when their attendance would jeopardize
the defendant's rights. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Court
observed that reporters have the same right of access to any information as
that held by the public generally, and that there are numerous sources which
neither group may draw upon. Id. at 684. For example, the Court stated,
"[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or
disaster when the general public is excluded, and they may be prohibited
from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are
necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial tribunal." Id.
at 684-85.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." Id.
The interpretation given to the first amendment is that it broadly protects
rights of expression. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black stated that "the history and
language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be
left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions,
or prior restraints." Id.
24. See notes 25-33 and accompanying text infra.
25. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
26. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
27. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 263. Speaking of the extent of
the protection provided by the first amendment, the Court stated that the first.
amendment "must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit
language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow." Id. See
also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. at 347. Relying on Bridges, the Pennekamp Court stated that "[f]reedom of discussion should be given the widest
range compatible with the essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice." Id.
The Court continued this theme in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), where it restated the need for robust public discussion of the
functioning of the courts, noted that the majority of the public would be
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about judiciai conduct will likely have their greatest impact while the
case is pending and if discussion is restrained until the adjudication is
concluded, it may by then be yesterday's news.28 More recently, in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,29 the Court indirectly reaffirmed,
in a classic prior restraint context, the existence of first amendment
protection for press reports of judicial proceedings.8 0 Reviewing an
order prohibiting publication of accounts of a pretrial proceeding
which the press attended,8 ' the Court held that any abridgement of first
amendment rights would necessarily require consideration of other, less
drastic, methods of protecting the defendant's rights,8 2 possibly including the exclusion of the public from pretrial proceedings if the defendant consents8 8
The related controversy over the corollary to the right to publishan asserted first amendment right of access to information-was examunable to gain this information firsthand, and observed that "[w]ith respect
to judicial proceedings in particular, the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public
scrutiny upon the administration of justice." Id. at 492.
28. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. at 268. Considering the potential effect
of this type of contempt citation upon public discussion the Court stated:
It must be recognized that public interest is much more likely to be
kindled by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization,
however penetrating, of the historian or scientist. Since they punish
utterances made during the pendency of a case, the judgments below
therefore produce their restrictive results at the precise time when
public interest in the matters discussed would naturally be at its
height.
Id. In Pennekamp, the Court observed that "[d]iscussion that follows
the termination of a case may be inadequate to emphasize the danger to the
public welfare of supposedly wrongful judicial conduct." 328 U.S. at 346
(footnote omitted). This reasoning applied as well in Craig v. Harney. See
notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
29. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). In order to protect the defendant's sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, the Nebraska Supreme Court had
approved an order by the trial judge restraining publication or broadcast of
certain information concerning the case, including accounts of confessions
introduced in open court at the defendant's arraignment. Id. at 541-45. Several press and broadcast associations, publishers, and individual reporters petitioned for relief. Id. at 543.
30. Id. at 559-60.
31. See note 29 supra.
32. 427 U.S. at 563-64. The alternatives suggested by the Court included
change of venue, postponement of the trial, searching questioning of prospective jurors, emphatic instruction on each juror's duty, and gag orders on
attorneys, police, and witnesses. Id.
33. Id. at 564 n.8. The Court indicated that this measure was a possible
alternative, without squarely stating that it would approve of such a practice.
Id. The Court noted that closing the preliminary hearing would have prevented the press from hearing the defendant's confession, thereby eliminating
the need for the objectionable prior restraint on publishing and broadcasting.
id. at 568. For further discussion of Nebraska Press, see Comment, Gagging
the Press in Criminal Trials, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 608 (1975); Note,
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart: Balancing Freedom of the Press Against
the Right to a Fair Trial, 12 NEw ENG. L. REV. 763 (1977).
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ined by the Court in Kliendienst v. Mandel,34 where an alien intellectual
was refused entry into the United States.8 5 An action challenging the
exclusion was brought by the alien, and university professors who had
hoped to meet with him, in which it was asserted that the public had a
first amendment right of access to information which was sufficient to,
overcome the executive's authority to prohibit the entry.8 6 Although
the Court upheld the exclusion, it acknowledged the existence of the
asserted right.8

7

The strength of this first amendment right of access to,

ideas and opinions was made clear in First National Bank v. Bellotti.8
The Court in that case endorsed a "functional model" of the first
amendment,8 9 stating that a component of that model protects the
40
public's right to acquire information.
34. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
35. Id. at 756-59.
36. Id. at 762. For an extensive discussion of the asserted first amendment right of access, including an analysis of the impact of Richmond Newspapers, see O'Brien, Reassessing the First Amendment and the Public's Right
to Know in Constitutional Adjudication, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1980).

37. 408 U.S. at 762. The Court observed that "[i]n a variety of contexts
this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 'receive information
and ideas' . . . ." Id.

This right was held to be subservient to the plenary

power of Congress to control immigration, which it has delegated to the execu-

tive. Id. at 769-70.
38. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Bellotti involved a Massachusetts criminal statute
which prohibited banks and other corporations from making expenditures to
influence the outcome of referendum elections other than one materially
affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation. Id. at 767.
39. Id. at 776. The Court did not focus on the right of expression possessed by business organizations in finding the statute violative of the first
amendment's functional purpose, noting that:

The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the
party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper question therefore
is not whether corporations "have" First Amendment rights and, if
so, whether they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether [the statute] abridges expression
that the First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it

does.
Id. The first amendment is intended to ensure free discussion of governmental
affairs. Id. at 776-77. To accomplish this purpose, the first amendment
protects not only the right to free expression, but also includes a "role in
affording the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of
information and ideas." Id. at 783 (footnote omitted). A dissenting opinion
acknowledged this role as well. Id. at 806 (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White argued: "The self-expression of the communicator is not the only value
encompassed by the First Amendment. One of its functions, often referred to
as the right to hear or receive information, is to protect the interchange of
ideas." Id.
40. Id. at 783. Finding that the first amendment had a role to play in
protecting public access to ideas, the Court stated that "the First Amendment
goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw." Id.
justice Rehnquist dissented, finding that states may regulate the activities
of corporations in ways not applicable to natural persons. Id. at 826-27 (Rehn-
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In Branzburg v. Hayes 41 the Court acknowledged that the process
of newsgathering was itself entitled to some measure of first amendment
42
In
protection, although the scope of that protection was left unclear.
44
Pell v. Procunier43 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., decided to-

gether, the Court upheld prison regulations prohibiting reporters from
interviewing individual inmates with whom they had specifically requested to meet. 45 While neither affirming nor denying an asserted
right of access to sources of information, the Court indicated that, what4
ever the nature of that right, it had, in these cases, been satisfied. 6
47
However, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., which involved a challenge by
48
the press to access limitations imposed upon a county jail, a plurality
quist, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist expressed the opinion
that the first amendment has only a limited application to the states, and does
not prohibit this type of regulation. Id. at 823.
41. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
42. Id. at 667. The issue before the Court in Branzburg was whether
forcing reporters to testify before state or federal grand juries concerning possible observations of criminal activity made while gathering news abridged
first amendment rights. Id. The Court answered this question in the negative. Id. However, the Court stated that it did "not question the significance
of free speech, press, or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested
that news gathering does not qualify for first amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated." Id. at 681. This case did not present the proper circumstance,
in the Court's view, for extending such protection. Id. at 691-92.
43. 417 U.S. 817 (1974). The regulation challenged in this case was.
promulgated by the California Department of Corrections. Id. at 819.
44. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). The regulation challenged in this case was promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 844.
45. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. at 844.
46. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 830-33. The Court found that the press.
had access to information about prison conditions through other avenues and
that prison officials had substantial justification for prohibiting face-to-face
interviews with inmates. Id. A dissenting opinion indicated that the publicrelied on the press for information concerning public institutions and that this
regulation substantially interfered with the public's right to possess information
concerning the conduct of the government. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Rejecting an argument that the press should be given greater access to.
information than the public at large, the Court held that the right of access for
the press was coextensive with that possessed by the public. Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. at 833-35; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 850. Justice
Powell's dissent in Saxbe agreed with this proposition. Id. at 857 (Powell, J._
dissenting).
47. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
48. Id. at 3. Monthly public tours of the jail were scheduled, but the.
tours were of limited size, did not include viewing of the most notorious sections of the facility, and neither inmate contact, recording, nor photography
was permitted. Id. at 4-5. The Court framed the issue as whether the press.
had a right of access to the jail greater than that of the public. Id. at 3. The
answer to that question was negative. Id. at 11. See note 46 and accompanying.
text supra.
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of the Court found that neither the press nor the public had a constitu4 9
tional right of access to information within the government's control.
Against the right of the press to report on public events, courts must
balance the accused's right to a fair trial.50 The most notable recognition of the need to insulate the criminal justice system from the excesses of press coverage is found in the case of Sheppard v. Maxwell.51
While acknowledging the important role which the press plays in the
fair administration of justice, the Sheppard Court stated that trial judges
.have a duty to prevent publicity about a trial or investigation from infringing the rights of the accused. 52 The Court identified six procedures
that could protect those rights from the adverse effects of publicity,
including limiting the presence of the press in the courtroom. 58 Interference by the press in the trial process was also prohibited in Estes v.
Texas.54 In Estes, the Court found that the number, placement, and
,operation of both still and television cameras in the courtroom had had
a disruptive and prejudicial effect on the defendant's trial warranting a
reversal of his conviction.5 5 Recently, however, the Court has made
-clear that the presence of cameras in the courtroom is not per se violative of a defendant's right to a fair trial 56 and that the states are free
to allow cameras so long as their operation is carefully controlled and
57
the rights of the defendant are otherwise protected.
49. 438 U.S. at 8-16. The Court made
indicate that there was an absolute right of
that "[n]either the First Amendment nor the
a right of access to government information

clear that it had never meant to
access to information, concluding
Fourteenth Amendment mandates
or sources of information within

the government's control." Id. at 15. A dissenting opinion vigorously argued
that the gathering of information required constitutional protection, stating
that "[w]ithout some protection for the acquisition of information about the
,operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the
process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be stripped of
its substance." Id. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
50. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text infra.
51. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
52. 384 U.S. at 362-63.
53. Id. at 358. The other five suggested procedures for protecting the
,defendant's rights were change of venue, sequestration of the jury, insulating
witnesses from other testimony and from the press, issuing gag orders upon
trial participants, and granting a continuance until the publicity abates. 384
U.S. at 359-63.
54. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). For a discussion of Estes, see note 22 and accom.panying text supra.
55. 381 U.S. at 534-35.
56. Chandler v. Florida, 49 U.S.L.W. 4141, 4145 (Jan. 26, 1981).
57. Id. at 4146-47. The Court noted:
It is not necessary either to ignore or to discount the potential
danger to the fairness of a trial in a particular case in order to conclude that Florida may permit the electronic media to cover trials in
its state courts. Dangers lurk in this, as in most, experiments, but
unless we were to conclude that television coverage under all condi-

tions is prohibited by the Constitution, the states must be free to
experiment. We are not empowered by the Constitution to oversee
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The foremost case on the subject of public access to criminal proceedings prior to Richmond Newspapers was Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale.5s The publisher of area newspapers challenged an order, agreed
to by both the defense counsel and the prosecutor, barring the public
and press from a pretrial suppression hearing in a widely reported
murder case.59 The Court began its analysis by stating that trial judges
have a duty to protect a defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair
0
trial from the effect of prejudicial pretrial publicity.6
Focusing upon
the publisher's claim that the sixth amendment required that trials be
public, the opinion indicated that this right belonged exclusively to the
defendant.," Then, noting the value of public trials to the administration of justice, 2 the Court found it to be the duty of the prosecutor
to protect these interests. 63 However, while observing that the common
law tradition of open trials applies with equal force to civil and criminal
trials, the Court deduced that it was not subsumed within the sixth
amendment because that amendment's protections apply only to criminal
cases. 4 This enabled the Court, which continued throughout its opinion to speak of "trials" rather than suppression hearings, to hold "that
members of the public have no constitutional right under the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to attend criminal trials." 65 The Court
or harness state procedural experimentation; only when the state action
infringes fundamental guarantees are we authorized to intervene. We
must assume state courts will be alert to any factors that impair the
fundamental rights of the accused.
Id. at 4147. The Court further observed that the defendant retains the right
to argue, and bears the burden to prove, that the presence of cameras was.
prejudicial:
[A] defendant has the right on review to show that the media's coverage of his case-printed or broadcast-compromised the ability of the
jury to judge him fairly. Alternatively, a defendant might show that
broadcast coverage of his particular case had an adverse impact on the
trial participants sufficient to constitute a denial of due process.
Id.
58. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
59. Id. at 375.

60. Id. at 378. This duty was enunciated in Sheppard. See notes 51-53
and accompanying text supra. The Gannett Court indicated that when acting
to protect a defendant's rights, a judge has wide latitude: "[B]ecause of the
Constitution's pervasive concern for these due process rights, a trial judge may
surely take protective measures even when they are not strictly and inescapably
necessary." 443 U.S. at 378.
61. 443 U.S. at 379-80. Consistently speaking in terms of public trials,
rather than suppression hearings, the Court made clear that the press and public
enjoyed no right of access to criminal trials through the sixth amendment. Id.
62. Id. at 383.
63. Id. at 384 n.12. The Court indicated that the prosecutor would be
responsible for serving possibly conflicting interests: the public desire for an
open trial and the due process rights of the defendant. Id.
64. Id. at 386-87.
65. Id. at 391. See note 61 supra. Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring
opinion to emphasize that there is a distinction between an order closing a
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avoided considering whether the first and fourteenth amendments protected a public right of access to pretrial proceedings. Conceding for
the sake of argument that such a right exists, the Court found that, in
this case, it had been fully satisfied.66
Against this background, the Court in Richmond Newspapers considered whether the first amendment prohibits closure of a criminal
trial.6 7 Writing a plurality opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
noted preliminarily that, even though Stevenson's trial had concluded,
the case was not moot 68 and that the question of whether the Constitution guarantees such a public right of access was an issue which had
never been decided by the Court. 69
The Chief Justice then set forth a comprehensive account of the
development of the criminal trial in England and America 70 demonpretrial hearing and an order closing a trial. 443 U.S. at 394 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Another concurring opinion stated that, since the sixth amendment right to a public trial is personal to the accused, both pretrial proceedings
and trials may be closed upon the agreement of the parties, however trivial

their reason. Id. at 404 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

Focusing exclusively on

the sixth amendment, Justice Blackmun would have found a right of public
access to pretrial suppression hearings. Id. at 406-48 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
66. Id. at 392. The Court noted that at the issuance of the closure order
no one objected to it, the judge balanced the competing rights of the defendant
and the public, and the effect of the denial of access was only temporary, as a
transcript was eventually made available. Id. at 392-93. The dissent did not
reach the question of a first amendment right of access since it maintained that
the right is present in the sixth amendment. Id. at 413 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
,concurring in part and dissenting in part). A concurring opinion would have
held that, when a pretrial hearing is as significant to the course of the pending
litigation as this one was, a first amendment right of public access exists. Id.
at 397 (Powell, J., concurring). This right is limited, according to Justice
Powell, by the defendant's right to a fair trial and the government's need to
protect confidences. Id. at 398 (Powell, J., concurring). The trial judge is
obligated to consider whether alternative means will protect these interests.
Id. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring). On these facts, Justice Powell's conditions
for closure were satisfied: the trial judge weighed the competing interests and,
although he did not consider alternate means of protecting the defendant's
rights, none were brought to his attention. Id. at 401-02 (Powell, J., concurring).
67. 100 S.Ct. at 2821. See note 13 supra.
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2820. The Court noted that, even though the trial which
had precipitated the disputed order had concluded, "the underlying dispute is
'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'" Id., quoting Southern Pacific
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
69. 100 S. Ct. at 2821. While a similar issue had been presented in
Gannett, Chief justice Burger distinguished the earlier case from Richmond
Newspapers on two grounds: 1)Gannett considered closure of pretrial hearings,

not trials.

Id. (Chief Justice Burger had written a concurring opinion in

Gannett to emphasize this point. See note 65 supra.) 2) While Gannett con.sidered only sixth amendment arguments against closure, Richmond Newspapers
presented first and fourteenth amendment arguments. 100 S.Ct. at 2821. See
note 66 and accompanying text supra. Other justices distinguished Gannett
in various ways. See notes 95 (Justice Stevens), 96 (Justice Brennan) & 107
(Justice Stewart) infra.
70. 100 S.Ct. at 2821-23. See also Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. at
-419-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); notes 14-18 and accompanying text supra.
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strating a tradition of trials open to the public.l

The Chief Justice

also identified the benefits flowing from this policy, explaining that
72
public attendance assures that the proceedings will be fairly conducted,
will provide an outlet for the desire for vengeance that may smolder in
a community after the commission of a crime,73 and will instill in the
-community confidence that justice is done in its courts.7 '
The Court then observed that this combination of historic practice
and salutory result creates a presumption that criminal trials are to be
open 75 and noted that such a presumption is consistent with earlier
,cases in which the Court, without directly so holding, recognized a presumption of openness.76 The Chief Justice also noted that the absence
,of an explicit first amendment enumeration of the public's right of access to criminal trials 77 did not bar the Court from finding that this
presumption of openness is protected by the first amendment's guarantees
of freedom of speech and of the press.78 Endorsing a functional model
71. 100 S. Ct. at 2821. The Chief Justice began his review of the development of the criminal trial by noting that "[w]hat is significant for present
purposes is that throughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who
.cared to observe." Id. The tradition of openness dates from the period before
the Norman Conquest, when attendance by freemen was compulsory. Id.
When attendance was no longer required it became an option. Id. at 2822.
This option was noted by contemporary legal commentators throughout
English history. Id. The quality of openness was embraced by the American
-colonists and the Americans "retained a right of visitation" at trials. Id. at
2822-23, 2825.
72. Id. at 2823. The Chief Justice noted that public presence in the courtroom will discourage perjury, act as a check upon misconduct by participants
at the trial, and assure that decisions based upon partiality, rather than the
evidence, are less likely to occur. Id.
73. Id. at 2824-25.
74. Id. at 2825. Additionally, public access serves to educate the community concerning the operation of the courts. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2825-26 8c n.9. In support of this proposition the Court quoted
from Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (discussed at note 20 supra;
notes 51-53 and accompanying text supra); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965)
(discussed at note 22 supra; notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis.senting from denial of cert.); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (discussed at
note 20 supra); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (discussed at notes 21-22
and accompanying text supra); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946)
.(discussed at notes 20 Sc26-28 and accompanying text supra).
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2826. See note 23 supra.
78. 100 S. Ct. at 2826-27. This finding by the Court was possible because
"'[n]otwithstanding the appropriate caution against reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court has acknowledged that certain
unarticulated rights are implicit in the enumerated guarantees." Id. at 2829.
Examples of implicit rights, the Court found, include the rights of association,
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); interstate
travel, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) and Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); presumption of innocence, Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 503 (1976) and Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); judgment by
.a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
,(1970). 100 S. Ct. at 2829 n.16.
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of the first amendment 79 the Court stated that that the amendment does.
more than protect freedom of expression; it protects the process of communication.8 0 The Chief Justice then observed that the process of free
communication about the functioning of government 81 requires a degree
of public access to information about governmental operations and concluded that courtrooms may not be "summarily" closed to the public.sa
Refusing to further characterize the right to attend criminal trials, the
Chief Justice observed:
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a "right of access," . . . or a "right to gather

information," for we have recognized that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press would
be eviscerated."

. . . . The explicit, guaranteed rights to

speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial
would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could,
as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.8
The Court noted that the first amendment guarantee of a right to
peaceably assemble is also implicated by the closure of a trial.8 4 Like
other places traditionally open, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, a
courtroom is a public place where people have a right to gather.8 5
After identifying the public's right to attend criminal trials, 8 6 and

placing it within the first amendment, the opinion then stated that this
79. 100 S. Ct. at 2827. The Court stated that "[f]ree speech carries with
it some freedom to listen." Id. The functional model of the first amendment

was articulated in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text supra.
80. 100 S. Ct. at 2827. The Court quoted Bellotti in noting that "[t]he
First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression
of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information
from which members of the public may draw." Id., quoting First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
supra.
81. 100 S. Ct. at 2826-27. The Chief Justice stated that the first and fourteenth amendments, "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government." Id..
82. Id. at 2826-27. It was possible for the Court to find this prohibition
because courtrooms were presumptively open to the public when the first
amendment was adopted. Id.
83. Id. at 2827 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted), quoting Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681. But see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 10(reading Branzburg as implying no first amendment right of access to news
sources). For a discussion of Branzburg, see notes 41-42 and accompanying
text supra.
84. 100 S. Ct. at 2828.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2829. The Court noted that, although historically civil trials.
have also been presumptively open, whether the public has a right to attend
civil trials was not an issue in the case. Id. at 2829 n.17.
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right is subject to limitation.8 7 Without delineating when such limitation would be appropriate,88 the Chief Justice observed that in the
present case, the trial judge had made no findings concerning the nature
of the threat to the defendant's right to a fair trial,8 9 had given no
consideration to other less drastic measures which might have reduced
that threat, 90 and had not weighed the impact of the closure order
against the first amendment rights of the public and press. 91 Therefore, the order was held to be improper. 92 The Court implied, however,
that, were a judge to find an "overriding interest," a criminal trial
could be closed, first amendment guarantees notwithstanding.93
Justice White, in a brief concurrence, stated that an interpretation
of the sixth amendment as forbidding the exclusion of the public from
criminal proceedings, a position urged by Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Gannett in which Justice White had joined, would have made the
Richmond Newspapers decision unnecessary. 94 Justice Stevens concurred to emphasize the importance of the Court's holding that the
"acquisition of newsworthy matter" is entitled to constitutional protection. 95
87. Id. at 2830 n.18. The Court stated that its holding "does not mean
that the first amendment rights of the public and representatives of the press
-are absolute." Id.
88. Id. The Court reserved the question of what circumstances would
justify closing all or part of a trial to the public, but indicated that trial
judges retain the authority to place limitations on access for the purpose of
maintaining order. Id.
89. 1d. at 2829.
90. Id. at 2830. The Court suggested that sequestration of witnesses
and/or jurors might have provided sufficient protection for the defendant's
right to a fair trial without infringing upon the public's right to attend the
trial. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. This implication was manifest in the Court's holding that "[alb-sent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal
case must be open to the public." Id. (footnote omitted). What the necessary
findings would entail was not indicated, although the Court did speak of the
need to conduct a trial in a "quiet and orderly setting." Id. at 2830 n.18.
94. Id. at 2830 (White, J., concurring). See note 65 supra.
95. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Justice Stevens considered

this a "watershed case" since, in his opinion, it represented the first time that
the Court "squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter [as opposed to the dissemination thereof] is entitled to any constitutional protection

-whatsoever." Id. Furthermore, Justice Stevens interpreted the Court's holding to mean "that an arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by

the First Amendment." Id.
He distinguished this case from Gannett in two ways: 1) there were no
findings made by the trial judge in Richmond Newspapers, as there had been
in Gannett, to support the closure order; and 2) the issue in Gannett was

whether the sixth amendment secured a public right of access to court proceedings while Richmond Newspapers presented the issue in a first amendment context.

Id. at 2831 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).

For a discussion of
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Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment.96 Reviewing the cases dealing with a first amendment right of
access to information, 97 Justice Brennan found the issue of the existence
of such a right to be unresolved, but considered the cases as providing
factors to be weighed in determining if and when such a right exists. 98
He concluded, however, that a right of access is implicit in the first
amendment because that amendment protects not only the act of communication between speaker and listener but also the "indispensible.
conditions of meaningful communication." 99
Nevertheless, Justice Brennan noted that first amendment protection for the process of communication must be "invoked with discrimithe bases used by other justices to distinguish Gannett, see note 69 supra (Chief
Justice Burger); notes 96 & 107 infra (Justices Brennan and Stewart
respectively).
96. 100 S. Ct. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Brennan distinguished Gannett as having considered the question of a sixth
amendment right of access to pretrial proceedings while this case dealt with a
first amendment claim of a right to attend trials. Id.
97. Id. at 2832-33 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Brennan referred to Gannett (for a discussion of Gannett, see notes 58-66 and
accompanying text supra); Houchins v. KQED, Inc. (for a discussion of
Houchins, see notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co. (for a discussion of Saxbe, see notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
supra); Pell v. Procunier (for a discussion of Pell, see notes 43-46 and accompanying text supra); Estes v. Texas (for a discussion of Estes, see notes 22 &54-57 and accompanying text supra); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). 100
S. Ct. at 2832-33 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
98. 100 S. Ct. at 2832-33 (Brennan, J.,'concurring in the judgment). justice Brennan read the right of access cases as giving viability to the issue of
first amendment protection of such rights:
[T]he Court has not ruled out a public access component to the First
Amendment in every circumstance. Read with care and in context,
our decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that any
privilege of access to governmental information is subject to a degree
of restraint dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or confidentiality. . . . These cases neither
comprehensively nor absolutely deny that public access to information
may at times be implied by the First Amendment and the principles
which animate it.
Id.
99. Id. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan observed that
[the first amendment] has a structural role to play in securing and
fostering our republican system of self-government. . . . The structural model links the First Amendment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude
not only for communication itself, but for the indispensible conditions
of meaningful communication.
Id. (footnote omitted). Justice Brennan reasoned that the structural model's
implicit assumption that valuable public debate must be informed indicates
that the "indispensible conditions" include access to information. Id. For
further discussion of the structural model, see notes 79-83 and accompanying
text supra.
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197

nation and temperance," oo and a balance must be struck between the
101
He
need for the information and the justification for denying access.
identified two factors to be considered in striking such a balance: 1)
past practice with regard to access to the type of information sought 102
and 2) the effect of access upon the process which generates the infor03
mation sought.
In the context of public trials, Justice Brennan found that public
access to the courtroom has "been the essentially unwavering rule in
ancestral England and in our own Nation" 104 and that the public has a
legitimate interest in maintaining this access because of its salutory
effects on the trial process.' 05 Justice Brennan found that this combination of history and function creates a rebuttable presumption that
trials should be open to the public. 10 6
Justice Stewart also concurred in the judgment, finding that the
trial judge's failure to consider the public's first amendment rights required reversal of the closure order. 07 Justice Stewart noted, however,
that the first amendment right of access is not absolute, and identified
10
s
several restrictions upon it.
100. 100 S.Ct. at 2834 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Id. Justice Brennan stated that "[a]n assertion of the prerogative
to gather information must accordingly be assayed by considering the information sought and the opposing interests invaded." Id. (footnote omitted).
102. Id. Justice Brennan stated that the argument for a right of access
is greater when access to particular information has been the tradition. Id.
This is so "because the Constitution carries the gloss of history. More importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of
experience." Id.
103. Id. The effects to which Justice Brennan referred include whether
public access would enhance the process of generating the information sought,
see note 105 infra, or whether the process would be hindered by invasion of
"interests in security or confidentiality." 100 S. Ct. at 2833 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment). See note 98 supra.
104. 100 S. Ct. at 2836 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. Id. at 2837-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). The
effects identified by Justice Brennan include demonstrating to the public the
fairness of the judicial system, maintaining public confidence, acting as a check
upon possible abuse of judicial power, and aiding accurate fact finding. Id.
106. Id. at 2839 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). justice Brennan postponed a determination of the findings necessary to overcome this
presumption. Id. Nevertheless, he did suggest that a threat to national security might justify closing portions of a trial. Id. at 2839 n.24 (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice
107. Id. at 2841 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
Stewart's principal disagreement with the opinion of the Chief Justice was
the former's reading of Gannett as being concerned with the assertion of a
sixth amendment right of access to courtrooms generally, ignoring any distinction between trials and pretrial proceedings. Id. at 2839-40 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Stewart stated that the first amendment
right of access applies to both civil and criminal trials. Id. at 2840 (Stewart,
J., concurring in the judgment). He reserved the question of whether it also
applies to a pretrial suppression hearing. Id.
108. Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). The restrictions identified are those imposed for the purpose of maintaining order rather
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Justice Blackmun, also concurring in the judgment, adhered to the
view that the public has a sixth amendment right of access to trials. 10 9
He agreed, however, that the first amendment also protects this right 110
but expressed concern over the inability of the Court to achieve a clear
consensus concerning "the nature-and strictness-of the standard of
closure the Court adopts." "I1
Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating that, by dictating rules concerning the administration of justice to all fifty states, the Supreme Court
had, in his view, exceeded its capabilities."12 This expansion of the
Court's authority, he states, is "unhealthy" in that it smothers a pluralism
that would otherwise exist. 18 Given these considerations, Justice Rehnquist was reluctant to term the trial judge's closure order improper
1 4
given the absence of an explicit constitutional prohibition.
than secrecy. Id. Justice Stewart's articulation of these possible limitations
was similar to that contained in the opinion of the Chief Justice. See notes
87 & 93 and accompanying text supra.
109. 100 S. Ct. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Blackmun, author of a dissenting opinion in Gannett, viewed the sixth
amendment as providing a right of public access to both trials and pretrial
suppression hearings. Id. See note 65 supra. He considered Richmond Newspapers as resolving some of the confusion engendered by the Gannett opinion,
concluding that "[t]he Court's ultimate ruling in Gannett, with such clarification as is provided by the opinions in this case today, apparently is now to
the effect that there is no Sixth Amendment right on the part of the publicor the press-to an open hearing on a motion to suppress." 100 S. Ct. at 2842
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in the original).
110. 100 S. Ct. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Forced
to look beyond the sixth amendment, justice Brennan was "driven to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First Amendment must provide some
measure of protection for public access to the trial." Id.
Ill. Id. Justice Blackmun pointed to the variety of language used in the
separate opinions to mark the scope of the public's right of access to trials
as indicating that a first amendment approach to this right is "troublesome."
Id.
112. Id. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). justice Rehnquist indicated
that this task exceeds the abilities of the Court. Id. He observed:
The proper administration of justice in any nation is bound to be a
matter of the highest concern to all thinking citizens. But to gradually rein in, as this Court has done over the past generation, all of
the ultimate decisionmaking power over how justice shall be administered, not merely in the federal system but in each of the 50 states,
is a task that no Court consisting of nine persons, however gifted, is
equal to.
Id.
113. Id. Justice Rehnquist disapproves of such a concentration of power
in the hands of nine men, all lawyers, who enjoy life tenure in their positions. Id. Moreover, in First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, Justice Rehnquist
expressed doubt about the extent to which the first amendment is applicable
to the states. See note 40 supra.
114. 100 S. Ct. at 2844 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
believes that no part of the Constitution may be "fairly read" as prohibiting
this closure. Id.
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On review of the Richmond Newspapers decision, it is submitted
that the Court's reasoning leaves many questions unresolved. Following a comprehensive review of the history of public attendance at criminal trials 115 and the benefits flowing from open courtrooms," 06 Chief
Justice Burger concludes that a presumption of openness "inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice." 117 The
presumption alone, however, does not create a constitutional right of
attendance for the public or press, 1 8 and the Court then attempts to
identify a constitutional source of the right to attend trials. 1 9 The
Chief Justice's opinion acknowledges that this precise question has
never before been addressed, noting that in Gannett "[t]he Court held
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to the accused of a public trial
gave neither the public nor the press an enforceable right of access to a
pretrial suppression hearing," 120 and calls attention to his concurrence
in Gannett in which he "specifically emphasized" that Gannett did not
2
involve a trial.' '
Having pointed out that the slate on which he was about to write
was relatively clean, the Chief Justice does not address any sixth amendment considerations. 22 Assuming the validity of the distinction between
trials and pretrial hearings, it seems peculiar that the Chief Justice
would have foregone the opportunity to decide this case on that basis if
sufficient support could have been mustered. A review of the positions
taken by the justices in Gannett and the present case suggests that the
Court's failure to decide the issue based on the sixth amendment might
be a result of Chief Justice Burger's lack of belief in his own distinction. 123 Based upon their concurring opinions in Richmond Newspapers, it is clear that Justices White and Blackmun would have
supported such an effort. 24 Furthermore, as noted by Justice White's
Richmond Newspapers concurrence, 125 there were four votes-Justices
White, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall-in favor of finding a sixth
amendment right of access in the pretrial context. 2 6 It would seem
that, given their willingness to find a sixth amendment right of access
to pretrial suppression hearings, the existence of such a right in the
115. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.

116. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text supra.
117. 100 S. Ct. at 2825.

118. Id. at 2826.
119. Id. at 2826-29.
120. Id. at 2821 (emphasis in the original). See note 69 supra.
121. 100 S. Ct. at 2128, citing Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. at
394 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
122. 100 S. Ct. at 2814-30. See id. at 2830 (White, J., concurring).
123. See notes 124-30 and accompanying text infra.
124. See notes 94 & 109 and accompanying text supra.
125. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 (White, J., concurring).
126. Id.
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context of a trial would follow a fortiori.127 Thus, these four justices,
together with Chief Justice Burger, constitute a potential majority of
the Court which may support a sixth amendment right of access to
criminal trials. Nevertheless, the Court "eschewed the Sixth Amendment
route." 128 Either Chief Justice Burger, having reserved the question of
the sixth amendment's applicability to a right of public access to trials,
would decide that question in the negative; or Justices Brennan and
Marshall accept the references to "trials" in the Court's Gannett opinion 129 at face value and feel that precedent now constrains them to
pursue the first amendment approach.'s 0
Having refused to ground its opinion on the sixth amendment,
choosing instead to base a presumption of openness on the strength of
a combination of past practice and salutory result 131 and rooting that
presumption within the first amendment, the Court has created for itself
several opportunities. The first of these is the ability to place limitations upon the newly recognized right,132 although the precise definition
of these limitations is left for another day. 33 If supported by clearly
articulated findings of the trial judge, a number of interests may be
sufficient to overcome the presumption of openness identified by the
Court in this case, although the analysis to be used and weight to be
afforded the competing considerations are by no means clear. 34
Foremost among these would appear to be the defendant's right to
a fair trial. 3 5 A finding that the presence of the public and press would
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
129. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. at 382-83, 391.

See note 61

and accompanying text supra.
130. See 100 S. Ct. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Brennan appears to feel that Ganneltt settled sixth amendment asser-

tions of a right of public access to trials, describing its holding as being "that

the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was personal to the accused, conferring no right of access to pretrial proceedings that is separately enforceable by the public or the press." Id.
131. See notes 70-76 & 100-06 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 87, 93, 106 & 108 and accompanying text supra.
133. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 n.18. The Chief Justice, in declining to specify
when a trial may be closed, stated: "[w]e have no occasion here to define the
circumstances in which all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the
public ....... .Id.
Justice Brennan agreed with this reservation of the
question, stating: "[w]hat countervailing interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this presumption of openness need not concern us now
...
" Id. at 2839 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote
omitted).
134. Id. at 2830 n.18.
135. Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). This was
the justification offered for the closure order in this case. Id. at 2819. Recognizing that this contention was not without merit, Justice Stewart stated that
"while there exist many alternative ways to satisfy the constitutional demands
of a fair trial, those demands may also sometimes justify limitations upon the
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make a fair trial impossible may overcome the presumption of public
access to criminal trials. 13 Before ordering closure, however, the judge
must consider other steps short of closure which may protect the de37
fendant's rights without as significant an impact on the public's rights.1
Another interest that may be sufficient to overcome the presumption
of public access to criminal trials is the protection of youthful witnesses,
usually victims, testifying about obscene and disgusting acts. 13 8 It must
be noted that, in finding a presumption of openness, the Court relied
on the historical practice and functional benefits of open trials. 18 9
140
However, neither consideration may be applicable to such testimony.
It has not been the universal practice to allow the public to attend trials
while youngsters testified about sex crimes, partly because such attendance may intimidate or traumatize the child. 41 Thus, limits upon
142
public access may still retain validity in such cases.
unrestricted presence of spectators in the courtroom." Id. at 2840 (Stewart,
J., concurring in the judgment).
136. See note 135 and accompanying text supra.
137. See note 90 and accompanying text supra. Justice Stevens pointed
out the absence of a record justification for the closure order in this case.
100 S. Ct. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring). justice Stewart stated that this
order must be reversed because the judge gave no consideration to the rights
of the public or press to be present. Id. at 2841 (Stewart, J., concurring in
the judgment). See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
It seems difficult to imagine a circumstance where the presence of the
public at a trial would pose a threat to the defendant's rights that could not
be met by some remedial step short of closure, for example, sequestration of
the jury. 100 S.Ct. at 2830. Justice Brennan observed that "[s]ignificantly,
closing a trial lacks even the justification for barring the door to pretrial hearings: the necessity of preventing dissemination of suppressible prejudicial
evidence to the public before the jury pool has become, in a practical sense,
finite and subject to sequestration." Id. at 2839 (Brennan, J., concurring in
the 'judgment). While a threat might be posed by the presence of demonstrably partisan or unruly spectators, or by a crowd so large as to alter the
atmosphere of the court, there seems to be no doubt that a trial judge could
respond to this situation through appropriate steps to limit access to the
courtroom. Id. at 2830 n.18. Such problems seemed to be those with which
the Chief Justice was principally concerned. Id. Justice Stewart used virtually identical language when considering possible justifications for access
restrictions to trials. Id. at 2840 (Stewart, j., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Brennan made the point that "[t]he presumption of public trials is,
of course, not at all incompatible with reasonable restrictions imposed upon
courtroom behavior in the interests of decorum." Id. at 2839 n.23 (Brennan,
J., concurring in the judgment). Of course, any limitations imposed would
have to provide for adequate representation by the press. Id. at 2830 n.18.
Justice Stewart also indicated the need for providing press access at all times
during which the public is afforded access. Id. at 2830 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
138. 100 S. Ct. at 2840-41 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
139. See notes 75 Sc 102-06 and accompanying text supra.
140. See note 141 and accompanying text infra.
141. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. at 388 n.19.
142. See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
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Finally, national security interests were specifically identified as onepossible justification for denying public access to a criminal trial. 143
In order to prove that a defendant in an espionage trial revealed a
state secret it may be necessary to disclose that secret. Were revelation
of the secret to imperil the nation's security, this interest would be
balanced against the benefit of public access to both the fact-finding
process and the public's ability to acquire information necessary for an
intelligent evaluation of the judicial process. 144 Quite conceivably, the
greater weight could permissibly fall upon the side of a brief limitation
on public access to the courtroom. Of course, the defendant in a criminal trial has a sixth amendment right to demand a public trial, and, if
he does so, the extent of the public's right of access would be a moot
question.
Whether the right of the public to attend trials identified in this
case applies to civil, as well as criminal, trials is left unanswered by
the Court. 145 In all probability, it does. The two pillars of the Court's
reasoning, history 148 and function,1 47 apply equally well to both kinds
of trials. However, in the civil area as well as in the criminal area, the
presumption of openness could be overcome by an "overriding" interest.' 48 If the civil suit were to seek legal redress for the revelation of a
trade secret, for example, public access to the courtroom during testimony outlining the secret itself would be inimidal to the purpose of
49
the suit.
The Court's holding in Gannett that the public may not gain access to a pretrial suppression hearing through the sixth amendment,
and its holding in Richmond Newspapers that the first amendment assures a degree of access to criminal trials, leaves open the question of
whether the first amendment provides a public right of access to sup143. 100 S. Ct. at 2839 n.4 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).

144. See notes 93, 98 & 101-03 and accompanying text supra.
145. 100 S. Ct. at 2830 n.17. But see id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring
in the judgment) (first amendment access rights apply equally to civil and
criminal trials).
146. Id. at 2830 n.17. The Chief Justice stated that "[w]e note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open." Id.
147. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text supra. Indicating that these
benefits are equally relevant in the context of a civil trial, Justice Brennan
stated that "mistakes of fact in civil litigation may inflict costs upon others
than the plaintiff and the defendant." 100 S. Ct. at 2838 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
148. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.

Arguably, the public interest in attending crimi-

nal trials is greater than in attending civil trials. Id. at 2827. If an "overriding" interest justifies closing the former, certainly any presumption of openness concerning the latter could also be overcome.
149. See id. at 2841 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). justice
Stewart suggests that maintenance of trade secrets may justify the closing of
portions of civil trials. Id.
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pression hearings.150 The principal reason for excluding the public
from such a proceeding would be to prevent potential jurors from reading or hearing press accounts concerning the nature of evidence suppressed.' 5 ' This concern could be satisfied, however, either by a change
of venue or by a delay of the trial until publicity had abated, remedies
that preserve the interests of the public. The most compelling situation
for admitting the public would appear to arise when the outcome of
the hearing could be determinative of whether there will be any further
52
litigation.
For the first time, the Court has recognized constitutional protection
for the "acquisition of newsworthy matter." 153 In determining whether
this protection would extend to material other than a judicial proceeding, courts will undoubtedly look to the information sought and the
interest invaded. 5 4 Historic practice with respect to this information
will be a consideration.' 5 5 Thus, the reasoning of this decision is unlikely to open doors traditionally closed to the public but could prevent
the closing of doors traditionally left open. Additionally, the effect of
public access to information upon the process of generating that information would have to be considered,156 and before granting access to
57
particular information a court would consider the interest invaded.
It would determine whether public access would destroy confidences,
interfere with security, 5 8 or disrupt the orderly conduct of administra150. Id. at 2839-40 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). Historical
practice with respect to public access to pretrial hearings is not as clear as it
is with respect to trials. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. at 387-91.
151. See note 137 supra.

152. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. at 434-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A pretrial suppression hearing may be the only judicial proceeding
of significance during a criminal prosecution, and may provide the only forum
for scrutiny of the conduct of law enforcement personnel. Id.
153. 100 S.Ct. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
155. See notes 70, 71, 82 & 102 and accompanying text supra.
156. 100 S. Ct. at 2834 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Brennan reasoned that a party seeking access to particular information will
not succeed merely by arguing that public possession of the information will
improve the quality of public discussion. Id. justice Brennan stated that
"[a]nalysis is not advanced by rhetorical statements that all information bears
upon public issues; what is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a
particular government process is important in terms of that very process." Id.
Admitting the public to a trial improves that trial. See notes 72-74 & 105 and
accompanying text supra.
157. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
158. See note 98 supra. See also Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. at
398 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell, while recognizing a first amendment right of access to pretrial suppression hearings, also recognized that
"[t]he right of access to courtroom proceedings, of course, is not absolute. It
is limited both by . . .needs of government .. .to preserve the confidentiality
of sensitive information and the identity of informants." Id.
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tive functions.' 59 Finally, articulated justifications for denying access
to information and a balancing of first amendment rights of access by
the denying authority would be accorded weight during judicial review.1 60 In light of the foregoing, it would appear that Richmond
Newspapers is not the equivalent of a "freedom of information act" or a
judicial "sunshine law," but it will serve to prevent government entities
from arbitrarily denying access to information which has long been
available to the public and press.' 6'
Bucky Mansuy
159. See notes 43-49 and accompanying text supra. This was a major
factor in the jail access cases. Id.
160. 100 S. Ct. at 2830. Findings are required to close a trial. Id. at
2841 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
161. But see Goodale, Gannett is Burned by Richmond's First Amendment
'Sunshine Act', Nat'l L.J., Sept. 29, 1980, at 24.
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